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The Remembrance of the Katyń Massacre 
and the President Lech Kaczyński's concept of Polish-Russian Relations 
[2005-2010]
by Patryk Wawrzyński MA.
Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Lech  Kaczyński's  tragic  death  was  a  direct  cause  of  the  détente in  Polish-
Russian  relations,  proclaimed  by  Prime  Minister  Donald  Tusk  and  his  Russian 
counterpart Vladimir Putin just after the 2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 Crash. However 
this rapprochement is far from the political concept of the President. Considering the 
Polish internal debate on a proper form of Polish-Russian relations, I would like – in this 
short article to present a way, how the President Kaczyński understood challenges, that 
both nations have to pick up.
Taking the advantage of an examination of narrations, and results of my two-
year research on cultural and mythical aspects of Kaczyński's political concept, I would 
like to present the influence of the Remembrance of the Katyń Massacre [in the wider 
perspective  of  Russian  and  Soviet  crimes  committed  on  the  Polish  Nation]  on 
assumptions of a Polish-Russian Reconciliation. In the first place I describe the inter-
relation between the Past  and the Present  in Kaczyński's  outlook,  then I present his 
narrations about the Katyń Massacre and the Russian Expansionism. Afterward I will 
present an influence of the Past on contemporary issues in Polish-Russian relations.
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The Periodicity of the History
Understanding the Lot of the Nation as a recreation of an invariable events cycle 
is characteristic for President Lech Kaczyński's narrations about the Past. The recurrence 
of  resistance,  defiance against  tyranny, and struggle for  the national survival  is  – in 
Kaczyński's concept – substantiation for more then just a power ga-me, the Periodicity 
means  that  the  necessity  of  creating  a  strong  and  sovereign  state  becomes  every 
generation's duty and a one and only chance to avoid a national disaster.
The zenith of the national Lot falls on the 20th Century, when, as Kaczyński 
stated during the decoration of the 'Solidarity' activists in February 2010, consecutive 
generations  have  experienced  “the  captivity  from  occupiers,  invaders,  totalitarian 
ideologists, and public officers serving outside Power's interests. […] Repeatedly, there 
were attempts to capture from Poles their identity, history, sense of own human value, 
ownership, and the right to determine own future”1. Polish national identity is hardly 
related  to  sacrifice,  martyrdom,  and  struggle  against  evil.  Simultaneously,  national 
history includes countless examples of heroism, triumph, and immortal successes, but at 
all times their achievements are endangered and impermanent.
Endeavors of foregoing generations become an inspirations for successive ones. 
Polish history is a relay race of – sometimes efficient, sometimes not – struggles against 
external Powers and desires for independence and state's security. From the November 
Uprising 1830-1831, and the January Uprising 1863-1864, through the 1905 Revolution, 
and World War I, to the 1939 Defensive War, the Polish Underground State during World 
War II, the 'Cursed Soldiers' afterward, and anticommunist opposition movements in the 
time of the People's Republic of Poland.
On  the  2007  National  Independence  Day,  posthumously  decorating
paramount  'cursed  soldiers'  Kazimierz  Kamieński  'Huzar'  [en.  'Hussar'],
Władysław Łukasiuk    'Młot'     [en.    'Hammer'],    and     Zygmunt    Szyndzielarz    
1 Kancelaria Prezydenta RP [KPRP], List podczas odznaczeń w siedzibie NSZZ Solidarność, 8th February 2010, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 21.11.2011].
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'Łupaszka', Kaczyński emphasized that their heroic testimonies to patriotism were an 
inspiration for his generation to object durability of the Cold War order and to oppose 
the communist authority to rule Poland2. 
Likewise, in December 2009, during the ceremony of unveiling the Memorial to 
the Victims of the Communism in Łódź, Kaczyński appealed to the public, reminding 
that the inspiration of the underground resistance during World War II and afterward 
rose to sequential social spurts: the Poznań 1956 protests, the 1968 March events, the 
1970 'Coastal'  protests, the 1976 June protest, and finally the Birth of the 'Solidarity' 
social movement and its continuation during martial law and afterward, that together 
“lead us to cast off the communist yoke and regain the sovereign and democratic state”3.
The Periodicity of the Polish history was the President's motivation to support 
the development of state's Politics of Memory, that – he hoped – would establish the tie 
between present-day society and the prior generations' heritage. Kaczyński mentioned it 
even in his 2008 New Year's Address, asking the Nation for common endeavors to raise 
welfare  and  secure  Poland4.  He  believed  that  the  Remembrance  of  History  enables 
comprehending a requirement of setting up effective and modern state able to counteract 
and recover from a crisis. 
On  the  eve  of  the  91st Anniversary  of  Poland's  assumption  of  independent 
statehood Kaczyński reminded that “in the space of last two hundred years, We, Poles,  
did not have too much opportunities to determine our lot independently. Rarely, we had 
a chance to set up a sovereign state, in which Poles – en block and each apart – might 
shape the standard of existence on their own. We have had this opportunity twice: in 
times of the Second Polish Republic and after 1989 year”5.
2 KPRP, Polityka budowania prawdziwych autorytetów, 11th November 2007, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 19.11.2011].
3 KPRP, List prezydenta na odsłonięciu Pomnika Ofiar Komunizmu, 12th December 2009, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 20.11.2011].
4 KPRP, Orędzie noworoczna Prezydenta RP, 31st December 2008, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-
aktualnosci/ [accessed: 22.11.2011].
5 KPRP, Prezydent: Państwo polskie musi stać się jeszcze silniejsze, 10th November 2009, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 19.11.2011].
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The  permanent  reconstructing  History  was  the  part  of  Kaczyński's  thinking 
about  the  Past  groundwork.  The  Periodicity  may  be  experienced  at  least  in  three 
different  perspectives:  firstly,  during  more  then  thousand  years  of  Polish  statehood 
integrally;  secondly,  during the  20th Century;  and thirdly,  with reference to effective 
social  defiance  against  enforced  communist  authorities  in  the  time  of  the  People's 
Republic of Poland. This national experience has fundamental meaning for Kaczyński's 
political concept, because it instructs that even [or first of all] in the time of stability and 
prosperity the Nation ought to expect returning, ravaging, an the worst possible Danger. 
Due to it Kaczyński's political goal was to establish enough strong state's structure and 
enough close international alliances to be able to counteract all threats and as a result 
evade next national enslavement, and successive generations' liberation struggle.
The Remembrance of the Katyń Massacre
In majority, President Kaczyński's interest in the Polish History was enclosed in 
the  20th Century,  that  was  the  sine  wave  including  national  ups  and  downs.  Tragic 
struggles  against  Communist  and  Nazi  totalitarian  ideologies  cost  Poles  the  biggest 
price.  Heroism  and  valor  were  insufficient  against  a  material  power  and  sinister 
expansion  of  two  aggressors:  German  Nazis  and  Soviet.  From  both  Polish  society 
encountered  only  atrocity  and cruelty,  represented by  Nazi  genocidal  politics  of  the 
Holocaust and Soviet extermination of Polish prisoners of war and civil servants in the 
Katyń Massacre6.
The  Soviet  hideous  crime  became  one  of  the  pillars  of  Kaczyński's
politics  of  memory  [that,  as  I  have  suggested  before,  was  in  the  President's
concept  the  basis  of  all  state  policies];  the  Katyń  Massacre  was  the  end  of
a  mythical  time  of  the  Sacred,  the  Calamity  that  demolished  the  Proper  Order,
6 KPRP, Prezydent: powinniśmy kontynuować proces upamiętniania ofiar, 17th September 2009, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 21.11.2011]; 
and KPRP, Prezydent w liście z okazji 91. rocznicy wybuchu Powstania Wielkopolskiego, 27th December 2009, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 22.11.2011].
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and forced the reestablishment of the whole cycle of the History. Kaczyński's narration 
on the Massacre is overfilled by pain and suffering, and it is the only one, that Polish 
President rehearsed, which did not contain the hope, and  the faith in humanity at all.
Even though, the decline of interwar Poland symbolizes the end of freedom and 
independence,  it  continues  to  be  an  evidence  of  the  strong  state,  that  brought  up 
generation of brave patriots, and became an exemplar for following generations. The 
Shoah represents  the end of Christian and humane values, the entire collapse of the 
Humanism – but in  the same time it  reminds us  about the courage and sacrifice  of 
Righteous among the Nations. The end of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising symbolizes the 
final demise of hopes for restoration a democratic and independent Poland after World 
War II, however it is the heroic act of resistance against totalitarian ideology, and the 
constitution  of  patriotism  and  liberation  struggle  for  next  generations.  Finally,  the 
martial law in Poland closes the time of dreams and freedom, and ends the nationwide 
carnival of 'Solidarity', but yet the resistance to the authorities comes to an end with the 
decline of the People's Republic and progressive transformation.
Only  the  Katyń  Massacre  remains  a  wound,  that  cannot  be  healed.  For 
Kaczyński it was the overfilled by embitterment narration, and the reason for a distrust 
toward Russians, the legate of the maleficent and totalitarian heritage of Stalinism. But 
first and foremost, the President understood the Massacre as a symbolic, willful crime 
committed  on  the  Polish  Nation,  that  has  never  been judged and punished,  and for 
almost a half of century was a subject of a rousing lie.
The issue of the Katyń Massacre victims' commemoration was for Kaczyński a 
question of the first rank. In April 2008 he wrote: “the Katyń Massacre victims – the 
flower  of  the  reborn  Second  Polish  Republic  –  payed  the  highest  price,  that  the 
Motherland could ever expected. Therefore, our duty is commemoration and honor to 
these thousands of heroes. And this historical remembrance is necessary for us, present 
Poles probably even more then for them”7.
7 KPRP, List Prezydenta RP do uczestników uroczystości upamiętniających mord polskich oficerów, 13th April 
2008, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 19.11.2011].
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In  Kaczyński's  opinion  the  Massacre  was  a  Soviet  vengeance  for  the
Nation,  that  stopped  a  procession  of  the  Bolshevism  in  1920  and  restrained
the  communist  plague  after  World  War  I.  And  it  was  not  only  a  crime
committed  on  this  Nation,  Joseph  Stalin's  aim  was  to  destroy  the
patriotic  tissue:  civil  servants,  military  commanders,  and  public  officers,
regardless  of  their  nationality.  Beside  Poles,  in  the  Katyń  Massacre
Belorussians,  Germans,  Jews  and  Ukrainians  were  murdered,
that  all  were  united  in  love  for  freedom,  and  loyal  service  for  the  interwar
Poland8. 
Their  'guilt'  was  resistance  against  maleficent  Stalin's  dreams,  and
wish  to  confront  the  Great  Russian  chauvinism9,  and  –  what  the  Polish
President  stated  just  two  days  before  his  tragic  death  in  the  2010  Polish  
ir  Force  Tu-154  Crash  –  “the  Katyń  'death  sentence'  had  to  be  a  death
sentence on the whole nation”10.
The  Remembrance  of  the  Katyń  Massacre  was  for  Kaczyński  “an  obli-
gation  towards  those,  who  […]  expected  families  and  friends,  colleagues
and  subordinates  in  vain.  It  is  a  call  to  never  forget  their  sacrifice,  because
it  is  and  it  will  be  a  part  of  our  common  national  identity”11.  The  example
of  implementing  the  Polish  President's  concept  were  ceremony  “Katyń.
Pamiętamy  –  Uczcijmy  Pamięć  Bohaterów”  [en.  “Katyń.  We  Remember
–  To  Honor  the  Remembrance  of  Heroes”]  in  November  2007.  During
two  days  roll-call  the  list  of  this  Soviet  genocide,  and  on  the  President's
8 KPRP, Pamiętajmy dalej, pamiętajmy w przyszłości”, 14th April 2008; and KPRP, „Uroczystości w Katyniu, 17th 
September 2007, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 18.11.2011].
9 KPRP, Wystąpienie Prezydenta RP pod pomnikiem Poległych i Pomordowanych na Wschodzie, 17th September 
2009, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 21.11.2011].
10 KPRP, List prezydenta podczas obchodów 70. rocznicy Zbrodni Katyńskiej w Gorzowie Wlkp., 8th April 2010, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 22.11.2011].
11 KPRP, Ten akt ludobójstwa głęboko utkwił w świadomości naszego narodu, 29th March 2009, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 21.11.2011].
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own initiative all victims were posthumously promoted to a higher military and service 
rank12.
Reminding the Katyń Massacre Kaczyński disseminated the Remembrance of 
Soviet war crimes in Turza [today, a small village in Subcarpathian Voivodship], entitled 
'the small Katyń'13, where in July 1944 Polish prisoners of war from underground Armia 
Krajowa, interned in the Trzebuska prisoner camp, were slaughtered by Soviet People's 
Commissariat  for  Internal  Affairs'  [NKVD] special  units.  Kaczyński  claimed to  pay 
homage to heroes, that alike the Katyń Massacre victims had to be killed just because 
they opposed against expansion of the Stalinist totalitarianism14.
The tragedy of Soviet crimes of Polish prisoners of war comes out as – similar 
to Nazi's – dehumanization and depriving victims' dignity. Even though, before Polish 
and  Soviet  soldiers  fought  against  common  enemy,  jointly  contributed  to  the  final 
triumph  over  German  Nazis,  Soviet  NKVD  officers  treated  Polish  combatants  as 
unworthy soldier's  death15.  An assassination  and omnipresent  lie  were  inscribed into 
assumptions  of  the  Stalinist  state,  without  distinction  if  it  was  related  to  enemies, 
unfavorable neighbors, allied forces or its own citizens.
Kaczyński  believed  that  international  debate  should  be  the  symbolic 
representation  of  the  Katyń  Massacre  and  may  undermine  the  influence
of  recognition  Nazi  totalitarian  regime  as  the  only  one  case  of  Supreme
Evil  during  the  20th Century.  He  tried  to  prove  that  like  German  expan-
sionism  brought  tragedy  of  Shoah,  Russian  chauvinism  also  led  to  a
magnitude  of  villainy.  Kaczyński's  endeavors  for  international  recognition
that  the  Katyń  Massacre  as  a  Crime  of  Genocide  aimed  at  the  remem-
12 KPRP, Prezydent RP wziął udział w uroczystościach „Katyń Pamiętamy – Uczcijmy Pamięć Bohaterów, 10th 
November 2007, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 18.11.2011].
13 This term is also used with reference to the 1945 Augustów Roundup. 
14 KPRP, List prezydenta na uroczystościach mordu w Trzebusce, 20th September 2009, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 21.11.2011]. 
15 KPRP, List Prezydenta RP do uczestników i organizatorów uroczystości upamiętniających zbrodnię w Turzy, 
16th September 2007, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 19.11.2011].
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brance of all Stalinist victims and showing the International Community how it may take 
effect on  concession policy in the case of reborn Russian imperialism. 
The  Polish  President  was  not  confined  to  the  Remembrance  of  the  Katyń 
Massacre or  even all  Polish victims of Soviet  repressions – he reminded all  Stalin's 
crimes during celebrations of the Holodomor [the genocide-famine in Ukraine between 
1932 and 1933], supporting Baltic States' efforts to commemorate victims of communist 
crimes during World War II and after it. The paramount expression of his idea was his 
solidarity  with  Georgia  and active  support  for  this  state  during  the  2008  Georgian-
Russian War. In Tbilisi Kaczyński not only defended attacked ally, he wanted to show 
that Russian ambitions can be suppressed just only thanks to general objection of the 
International Community.
In Poland the President was accused of an anti-Russian, irrational phobia and 
pursuing  unfounded  policy  against  a  powerful  neighbor.  Nevertheless  Kaczyński 
believed that his concept was not constructed as an opposition to Russia, he perceived 
that  Putin's  transformation  of  Post-Soviet  Russian  identity  and  repudiating  Boris 
Yeltsin's assumption of the limited Power, and equal rank of all former Soviet states are 
challenging Polish identity. That is, the Polish President thought that his policy is not 
anti-Russian, but it was established as anti-Russian because of Putin's idea of Russian 
regional supremacy.
Kaczyński in his speech during international celebrations of the 90th Anniversary 
of  the outbreak of  World War II,  to some extent addressing Russian Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin, reminded that an united Europe achieved success thanks to two pillars 
of general agreement. First was the community of shared values: democracy, freedom, 
and pluralism, while second was a renunciation of hegemonic and imperial ambitions16. 
And from Russia he expected participating in this all-European agreement and respect 
for others identities and politics of memory, treating other nations as equivalent [alike 
not long ago Yeltsin did].
16 KPRP, Przemówienie Prezydenta na obchodach 70. rocznicy wybuchu II wojny światowej, 1st September 2009, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 22.11.2011].
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The New Face of Russian Imperialism
In general, the question of Polish-Russian relations and apprehension of Russian 
expansionism [what of course cannot be surprising] were fundamental for Kaczyński's 
political  concept.  These  problems were  a  'realm'  of  his  understanding of  the  Polish 
identity,  and more extensively post-communist  Central  European identity;  the Polish 
President believed that different historical experiences and distinct from West European 
understanding of the construction of Russian identity, obliged him to oppose not only 
Kremlin concepts, but equally West European efforts to deeper integrate Russia with the 
European Union.
Kaczyński comprehended Russian state – through the whole of its history, from 
the Grand Duchy of Moscow – as an aggressive, expansionist, imperial, and invasive 
Power, that endangered its neighbors. In his concept 'being Polish', and 'being Central 
European'  both meant to persist in spite of Russian thrusts; both this identities were 
constructed  with  reference  to  counteracting  Russian  influences,  and  an  objection  to 
Russian  dominance.  In  March  2008,  hosting  one  of  his  closest  political  partners 
Georgian  President  Mikheil  Saakashvili,  Kaczyński  noticed  that  the  Georgian-Polish 
partnership is established on the grounds of affection for freedom and heritage of the 
struggle against Russian enslavement17.
Interviewed  by  American  Fox  News  [just  eight  days  after  President
Obama's  cancellation  of  the  emplacement  of  Ballistic  Missile  Defense  [BMD] 
installations in Poland] Kaczyński asked about Russia, said that Russians always have 
the cheek to act in international politics. “If there is any occasion to do it,  this state 
becomes even more audacious” – he warned18. Repeatedly, Kaczyński cautioned against 
insatiability of Russian political elites, that may assume the totalitarian face, like it did in 
the times of the Stalinist crimes. He reluctantly received West European, cultural and 
political  leaders'  assumptions  that  the  Absolute  Dehumaniza-
tion  can  be   only   entered   into  the   Nazi   German   identity   and  should  not  be 
17 KPRP, Polska wspiera przynależność Gruzji do NATO, 3rd March 2008, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 20.11.2011].
18 KPRP, Wywiad prezydenta dla Fox News, 25th September 2009, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-
aktualnosci/ [accessed: 21.11.2011].
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applicable in the Russian case19. 
Kaczyński also forewarned against overestimating the identity change that took 
place in Russia after the decomposition of the Soviet Union. In September 2008, during 
the Foreign Policy Association's conference, the Polish President reminded that Russian 
“imperial tendency is slowly coming back to life in different ways; and the causes of this 
process are complicated. I suppose that the basic cause is this, what is entered into the  
heritage of a specific nation and state, what is the part of traditional relation between 
authorities  and  the  society.  […]  This  tradition  is  contrary  to  the  Transatlantic  one. 
Finally, the cause is that new governmental elite, appeared after communist times also 
emerged from the communist machinery. […] This mentality remains and it is not a 
mentality of civic state”20.
In the President's case the antipathy towards contemporary Russian elites was 
not  a  result  of incomprehensible prejudices,  it  resulted from mythologized vision of 
Eastern  neighbor's  imperialism.  The  expansionism  that  is  –  by  its  nature  –  anti-
Occidental and distant from Euro-Atlantic constitutional values. That is why answering 
the  current  Secretary  General  of  NATO  Andres  Fogh  Rasmussen's  suggestion  that 
Russian membership in the Alliance is theoretically possible, Kaczyński stated that with 
regard for a contradiction between heritages and a different approach to execution the 
National Interest Russia should not ever become a member of NATO21.
A re-definition  of  Russian  identity  in  the  21st Century  Kaczyński  followed 
anxiously. He believed that Russia may be an important and reliable neighbor, and a 
solid  partner  for  the  European  Union.  However,  otherwise  than  French,  German  or 
Italian political leaders, treating Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin as democratic 
politicians from an influential regional Power, Polish President preferred to recognize 
them as successors of the Soviet Establishment. 
19 KPRP, Wizyta Prezydenta RP na Ukrainie, 22nd November 2008, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-
aktualnosci/ [accessed: 20.11.2011].
20 KPRP, NATO to eksporter stabilizacji i pokoju, 24th September 2009, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 21.11.2011].
21 KPRP, W Belwederze o Afganistanie i Rosji, 12th March 2010, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-
aktualnosci/ [accessed: 23.11.2011].
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In November 2008 applying to the President of the European Commission Jose 
Manuel  Barroso  Kaczyński  wrote  that  “for  us  it  cannot  be
meaningless  on  the  basis  of  how  Russia  constructs  its  future.  We  have  the
right  to  expect  that  Russia,  benefiting  from  intensive  relations  with  the
EU  member-states,  should  respect  values,  that  constitutes  our  community.
[…]  If  we  eliminate  nationalism  from  European  societies,  we  may  anticipate
that  Russian  authorities  will  not  tolerate  it,  all  the  more  will  not  locate
it in the center of state's ideology”22.
Kaczyński  paid remarkable  attention  to  the  Polish  Energy Security,  and that 
made  him interested  in  Russian  natural  gas  imperialism.  Struggle  against  'energetic 
blackmail' was one of the main aims of the Kaczyński's Presidency and the goal for an 
Central European alliance, that he wished to establish23. He realized that future security 
of Poland depends on the elimination of menace from renascent Russian expansionism; 
and  Kaczyński  considered  that  it  requires  –  firstly  –  diversification  of  energetic 
resources supplies, and – secondly – strengthening NATO presence in Central Europe24. 
Besides  the  desire  of  constructing  modern  and  safe  Poland,  the  danger
of  Russian 'energetic  blackmail'  was  the  main reason for  Kaczyński's  concept  of  an 
energy policy. Ukrainian experiences in 2006 and cutting off [or drastic limitation of] 
natural gas' supplies to Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, Greece, Hungary, Turkey, 
and Ukraine in  2009 showed Kaczyński  how helpless  a  state  can be in  the  face  of 
political usage of controlled by Russian government OAO Gazprom. Simultaneously, 
the President was worried about Polish Energy Security because of German-Russian 
Nord  Stream  pipeline  project  [that  sometimes  was  paralleled
22 KPRP, List Prezydent RP do Przewodniczącego Komisji Europejskiej, 26th November 2008, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 20.11.2011].
23 KPRP, Lech Kaczyński, Wiktor Juszczenko, Mirek Topolanek: Kryzys gazowy się jeszcze nie skończył, 28th 
January 2008, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 19.11.2011]; 
and KPRP, Wywiad Prezydenta RP Lecha Kaczyńskiego dla agencji Reuters, 24th September 2009, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 22.11.2011].
24 KPRP, Prezydent w „New York Times” [The New York Times' interview with Lech Kaczyński], 12th March 2009, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 21.11.2011].
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with  the  1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,  dividing Northern  and Central  Europe  into 
German and Soviet spheres of influence].
That  were  all  the  reasons  of  Kaczyński's  fear  of  a  new  international  deal, 
dividing  the  World  into  areas  of  Power's  domination.  Sore  experiences  of  Russian 
chauvinism  and  expansionism,  communist  ancestry  of  the  current  Russian 
establishment, successful usage of OAO Gazprom's 'energetic blackmails' in 2006 and 
2009, building pipeline passing through the Baltic See, that increase European energy 
dependence on Russia, and at last Russian military support for separatist republics in 
Georgia were, in Kaczyński's opinion, arguments for his concept of counteracting an 
increase of Kremlin influences in Poland and the European Union. 
Nonetheless, the stab in the back came from the White House; President Barack 
Obama's decision to cancel emplacement BMD installations in the Czech Republic and 
Poland was made under the unambiguous Russian pressure. But the date of announcing 
American abdication was symbolic and extremely sore – it was obvious that results of 
the US President's decision made 17th September 2009 would be compared with the 
1939 Soviet invasion on Poland that was exactly seventy years before. Kaczyński who 
was describing German and Soviet  annexing of Polish territories as a destruction of 
'divine time' of the interwar Poland all the more felt offended by Obama's lack of respect 
for Polish history and his confession in relations with Russia25.
The Trial of Courage
The  mistrust  in  relations  with  Russia  was  the  groundwork  of  Kaczyński's 
political  concept  and  from  this  point  of  view  he  selected  his  closest  allies.
But  in  most  cases  it  was  just  a  supplementary  and  dispensable  factor:  with
Lithuanian  President  Valdas  Adamkus  connected  him  a  community  of
values  and  anti-communist  attitude,  with  Ukrainian  President  Victor
25 KPRP, Wystąpienie Prezydenta RP w Metropolitan Club w Nowym Jorku, 25th September 2009, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 21.11.2011].
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Yushchenko a desire to extend European community over Post-Soviet states, with Czech 
President  Vaclav  Klaus  an  euro-skepticism.  The  connection  between  Kaczyński  and 
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili resulted from common comprehension of the 
Russian imperialism. 
Georgian leader – although not devoid of weaknesses – in Kaczyński's vision 
grew  as  a  symbol  of  resisting  the  Kremlin  expansionism.  Both  of  the  politicians 
recognized present-day Russian authorities as successors of a sinister Tsarist and Soviet 
regimes, that instead of cruel colonization, dislocations, and genocide practices applies 
economic  dependence,  bribery,  and  the  'passport  policy'.  They  believed  that  even 
though, after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union, methods have changed, the dream of 
Russian supremacy has not. And this bond between Kaczyński and Saakashvili made 
possible the Polish President's moment of glory, which was his unforgettable speech in 
Tbilisi during the 2008 Georgian-Russian War. The speech, in which Kaczyński paraded 
his  own  understanding  of  the  Kremlin  intentions  and  the  way  to  restrain  Russian 
expansionism.
The relationship between two presidents requires a short comment. Anti-Russian 
view  was  the  cornerstone  of  their  partnership,  that  soon  included  other  common 
grounds. Kaczyński fully supported Georgian aspirations to become a member of NATO 
and the European Union, whereas Saakashvili returned his kindness actively taking part 
in Polish project of former communist state's close alliance. Both president's visions of 
the international security in the 21st Century were based on two assumptions: Russian 
chauvinism and expansionism danger, and understanding the United States' [and NATO 
in whole] identity as the only one Superpower that may be a guarantor of development, 
peace and stability in international relations. Additionally, Kaczyński and Saakashvili 
shared a deep patriotism and the respect for freedom fighters – national heroes, what 
was noticeable during the 62nd Anniversary of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising26.
Although,  presidents  were  close  allies,  that  what  was  characteristic  for
their  relationship  was  a  bond  of  mutual  amity.  After  Saakashvili's  electoral
victory   in   January   2008   Kaczyński    openly   stated    his   individual   satisfaction,
26 KPRP, Spotkanie Prezydenta RP z Prezydentem Gruzji, 2nd August 2006, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 17.11.2011].
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and respect for the Georgian politician and the far-sightedness of the Georgian Nation. 
Observing the  establishment  of  democracy in  this  South Caucasian state,  Kaczyński 
appreciated that  Georgia  was neither  following Polish  transformation,  nor  Ukrainian 
one, where [in both cases] internal disruption of democratic forces and fraternization 
with  old  political  elites  made  authentic  and  comprehensive  restoration  of  the  state 
impossible. He believed that Georgia thanks to Saakashvili may evade a dispelling of 
national hopes27. 
As it  was mentioned before, Kaczyński took the advantage of the History to 
motivate his political concept – sore experiences with Russian imperialism made him 
suspicious  towards  the  Kremlin  authorities,  while  heritage  of  anti-Russian  struggle 
entailed his fellow feeling for the Georgian Nation. In March 2008 supporting NATO's 
Membership  Action  Plan  for  Georgia  he  called  up  common  inheritance  of  anti-
Totalitarian  values,  mutual  understanding  of  Georgian  and  Polish  nations,  and  both 
nations'  congenital  aspirations28.  During  official  appointments  with  Saakashvili  he 
reminded  the  Georgian  voluntary  soldiers'  participation  in  the  struggle  for  Polish 
Independence29, their death in the Katyń Massacre, and courage and sacrifice during the 
1944 Warsaw Uprising30. 
There  were  three  main  reasons  why  Kaczyński  reacted  in  so  unequivocal
way  to  Russian  military  operation  against  Georgia  in  2008.  First  was
–  just  described  above  –  his  personal  bond  with  Saakashvili  and  respect  for
the  proud  Georgian  Nation.  However  two  other  were  key  ones.  He  really
believed  that  his  obligation  was  to  counteract  Russian  hegemony  in  Central
and  Eastern  Europe,  and  he  –  due  to  it  –  presumed  that  the  breakage
of  Georgia  would  in  the  near  future  mean  the  Russian  enslavement  of  the
whole    Post-Soviet     area.     Kaczyński     also     was     guided     by     the    interwar
27 KPRP, Wizyta Prezydenta RP w Gruzji, 20th January 2008, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-
aktualnosci/ [accessed: 20.11.2011].
28 KPRP, Polska wspiera przynależność Gruzji w NATO, 3rd March 2008, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 20.11.2011].
29 KPRP, Wizyta Prezydenta RP w Gruzji, 23rd November 2007, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-
aktualnosci/ [accessed: 19.11.2011].
30 KPRP, Wizyta Prezydenta Gruzji w Polsce, 10th May 2007, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-
aktualnosci/ [accessed: 19.11.2011].
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Poland's mythical Testament, that made his a promoter and representative of the self-
reliant alliance of Central and Eastern European states. In Tbilisi he was not just an ally 
meeting own obligations, he was the one who opened and read the interwar Poland's 
Will.
With no doubts,  Kaczyński's  involvement in the 2008 Georgian-Russian War 
was  the  culminating  point  of  his  Presidency.  Those  day  he  articulated  his  political 
concept  and  the  whole  political  World  was  focused  its  attention  on  him,  and  his 
opinions. Kaczyński proved his courage and devotion to values, that tried to incorporate 
into the Polish national identity and the international discourse. 
On the 9th August 2008, soon after the beginning of the War, Kaczyński stated: 
“the last 48 hours has deepen the crisis in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in a degree that 
we  so  far  [...]  have  not  expected.  What  happened  is  the  upfront  intervention  in  an 
exterior territory. [...] As a matter of fact the Russian Federation Forces' action is the Act 
of Aggression”31.  Immediately regional political leaders,  presidents: Estonian Toomas 
Hendrik Ilves, Latvian Valdis Zatlers and Lithuanian Adamkus gave him their support. 
Also the Ukrainian President Yushchenko soon joined the anti-Russian initiative. 
Three  days  later  on  Freedom  Square  in  Tbilisi  Kaczyński  delivered  his
the  most  memorable  speech.  He  said:  “We  are  here  to  express  our  solidarity.
[…]  We  are  here  to  take  up  the  gauntlet.  For  the  first  time  from  years  our
neighbor  […]  showed  his  face,  which  we  know  since  centuries.  This
neighbor  thinks  that  adjoining  nations  have  to   be  subordinate  to  it.  We
say:  no!  This  state  is  Russia.  This  state  considers  that  former  times  of
bankrupt  –  less  then  20  years  ago  –  Empire  have  returned.  It  thinks
that  a  dominance  will  be  a  regional  characteristic  once  again.  Well  it  will
not  be.  Those  time  ended  once  and  for  all.  […]  We  all  experienced
this  dominance  either  in  the  same  time  or  in  different  periods.  It  is  a
calamity  for  whole  Europe.  […]  Today,  the  World  had  to  react,  even
31 KPRP, O Gruzji w Pałacu Prezydenckim, 9th August 2008, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-
aktualnosci/ [accessed: 20.11.2011].
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if it was unwilling for this reaction. And we are here to make the World's respond much 
intensively”32.
During  his  speech  in  Tbilisi  Kaczyński  symbolically  came  into  the  Polish 
National Myth of the Freedom Struggle. For the short time he joined those, who had 
opposed to enslavement,  and had taken up the  gauntlet  without fear  of the possible 
consequences. Recalling the picture of Russia he reminded that Nazi Germany was not 
the only one that was Pure Evil in the 20th Century, but the communist Soviet Union was 
one and the same. Showing the face of Russian imperialism he was proving that Central 
and Eastern European states could evade a disaster only if it were united [what was in 
Kaczyński's opinion impossible by oneself].
The  Polish  President  has  crossed  a  line  separating  pragmatic  politics
from  imagination  of  the  'perfect'  World  constructed  on  values  [that  is
why,  after  his  death  Saakashvili  noticed  that  like  Otto  von  Bismarck  gave
future  generations  the  concept  of  Realpolitik,  Kaczyński  left  the  concept
of  moral-politics33].  In  Tbilisi  he  struggled  against  Russian  imperialism
like  protectors  of  the  Christian  Civilization  during  the  Bolshevik-Polish
War,  like  soldiers  fighting  against  the  Totalitarianism  on  all  Fronts  of
World  War  II,  like  heroic  Warsaw  insurgents,  and  like  'cursed  soldiers'  of
the  anti-communist  underground.  Again,  like  during  the  carnival  of
'Solidarity',  Kaczyński  defended  the  Weaker,  and  its  dignity  and  freedom.
He  took  the  side  of  values,  which  were  fundamental  for  his  political  concept:
courage, freedom, justice, patriotism, sacrifice for ultimate goals, and solidarity. 
During  the  2008  Georgian-Russian  War  Kaczyński  passed  his  trial,  and
he  experienced  his  days  of  glory.  Probably,  if  the  Polish  President  had  not
died  in  the  2010  Polish  Air  Force  Tu-154  Crash,  his  speech  in  Tbilisi  would
be the most important and the most memorable occurrence of his Presidency.
32 KPRP, Wizyta Prezydenta RP w Gruzji, 12th August 2008, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-
aktualnosci/ [accessed: 20.11.2011].
33 M. Saakashvili, Hołd Pamięci Przyjaciela [in:] M. Karnowski (ed.) Lech Kaczyński. Portret, Kraków 2010 p. 
252.
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Dilemmas of the Polish-Russian Reconciliation
I  already  noticed  that  the  understanding  of  the  Katyń  Massacre  made
President  Kaczyński  mistrustful  in  relations  with  Russia.  I  also  mentioned
how  his  comprehension  of  national  History  led  him  to  endeavors  to
establish  self-reliant  alliance  of  former  communist  states  in  Central  and
Eastern  Europe.  And  if  his  foreign  policy  concept  was  founded  on  the  fear
of  Russian  expansionism  [next  to  the  fear  of  German  domination  in  the
European  Union,  and  trust  in  the  United  States  as  a  guarantor  of  freedom,
peace,  and  stability],  is  it  even  possible  that  Kaczyński  desired  the  Polish-
Russian Reconciliation?
It is more then certain that he did. However this atonement was – in Kaczyński's 
opinion – impossible  until  the  Russian authorities  reject  the  Superpower  hegemonic 
identity, chauvinism and imperial tendencies. The way of restoring the Russian status in 
international relations, which Putin chose Polish President could not accept. 
The  increase  of  imperialist  tendencies  in  the  Kremlin  foreign  policy,  their 
'energy blackmail' strategy and the military operation to divide allied Georgia were in 
Kaczyński's vision only examples of a rebirth of the real Russian identity, that he knew 
from the Past. It is characteristic for the President that setting up his political manifestos 
was guided by historical experiences, and through this prism he glanced at the Present. 
His attitude to the 2008 Georgian-Russian War, and his commemoration of the Katyń 
Massacre victims [and other victims of communist repressions] were Kaczyński's own 
tribute to generations of Polish patriots.
Already  on  23rd December  2005,  the  day  of  Solemn  Oath,  the  Polish
President  delivered  the  speech  addressed  to  the  National  Assembly,  in  which
he  stated  that  with  reference  to  Polish-Russian  relations  it  is  necessary  to
be  patient,  but  never  to  disavow  sore  experiences  of  the  Past34.  Kaczyński
claimed  the  Remembrance,  and  the  Rehabilitation  for  victims  of  Soviet
crimes:  the  Katyń  Massacre;  NKVD  'troikas',  and  other  Soviet  instruments
34 KPRP, Uroczystość zaprzysiężenia Prezydenta RP Lecha Kaczyńskiego przed Zgromadzeniem Narodowym, 23rd 
December 2005, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 17.11.2011].
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of  extrajudicial  punishment;  Mass  Deportations  to  the  East  [mostly  to
Siberia and Kazakhstan], and forced labor camps [the Gulag System]35. 
The  'Russian  Evil'  was  in  President's  opinion  an  identical  twin-
brother  of  the  Nazi  one.  Communist  ideology  was  –  like  Hitler's  national
socialism  –  an  entire  denial  of  Christian  and  Human  values,  that  constituted 
contemporary  Europe.  The  Polish-Russian  atonement  was  only
possible  on  the  groundwork  of  the  European  Civilization,  therefore  a
mutual  renunciation  of  the  Bolshevik  and  Soviet  heritage  and  commemorating
victims  of  this  regime's  crimes.  Without  the  common  Remembrance
of  the  sore  Past  rapprochement  between  two  nations  could  not  be
attainable36.  But  in  Kaczyński's  opinion,  to  make  common  Remembrance
attainable  Russia  should  change  its  own  identity  and  ultimately  break  with
the  tradition  of  diktat,  and  unequal  treating  adjoining  states,  and  pure
and simply after this reconstruction dealing with the History would be possible37.
In  his  interview  for  “Super  Express”  Kaczyński  stated:  “the  respect  in
relations  with  neighbor  means  also  the  courage  to  face  the  truth,
when  this  neighbor  is  departed  from  it.  It  is  necessary  to  do  it  in  the  name
of  our  Memory.  But  above  all  for  our  Future.  Only  the  Truth  […]  can  be
a  solid  groundwork  for  Reconciliation”38.  Two  months  before  his  untimely
death  the  President  wrote:  “we  do  not  call  up  […]  suffering  in  the  spirit
of  rancor  or  the  lust  for  revenge.  We  know  that  History  […]  should  not
barricade  our  way  to  dialogue  and  atonement”39.  Kaczyński  truly  believed
that  friendly  relations  between  Poland  and  Russian  could  be  established  only
35 KPRP, Wystąpienie Prezydenta RP pod pomnikiem Poległych i Pomordowanych na Wschodzie, 17th September 
2009, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 21.11.2011].
36 KPRP, Oddajemy hołd ofiarom zbrodni katyńskiej, 5th March 2010, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 22.11.2011].
37 KPRP, Prezydent o reakcjach Rosji nt. uchwały Sejmu ws. 17 września, 24th September 2009, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 21.11.2011].
38 KPRP, Lech Kaczyński: Potrzebujemy solidarności, 5th September 2009, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 21.11.2011].
39 KPRP, List prezydenta z okazji 70. rocznicy Martyrologii Polaków na Wschodzie, 10th February 2010, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/ [accessed: 22.11.2011].
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through the Truth and mutual commemorating sore experiences of the Past. But he did 
not want to achieve the Reconciliation at  any price:  firstly,  he wanted to strengthen 
Polish identity, secondly, to establish a self-reliant Central European alliance, and after 
that he wished to come to an agreement with the Kremlin authorities.
Epilogue 
It  is  evident  that  the  core  of  Lech  Kaczyński's  political  concept  was  anti-
Russian.  Interpreting  the  Past,  the  Polish  President  was  afraid  that  an  increase  of 
Kremlin expansionism in Putin's era would result in next national and regional tragedy, 
like the Katyń Massacre. Only the Myth of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising is comparable [as 
the  most  powerful]  with the  narration about  Soviet  crimes committed on the  Polish 
nation.  However,  Kaczyński  reminded that  this  community  of  suffering unites  Poles 
with other nations enslaved by the Stalinist Soviet Union – victims of communism are 
not only Polish, but also few million of Russian and other nationalities.
The Symbol of this 'hell  of communism' is the Katyń Grave, where close to 
Polish patriots were buried – killed by NKVD officers – Belorussians, Jews, Latvians, 
Russians and Ukrainians40.  Similarly,  lots  of Polish exiles to Siberia and their  local, 
indigenous  neighbors  are  the  Symbol  of  Russian  repression  of  other  nations,  and 
Kaczyński  referred  to  their  inheritance,  recognizing  the  Sybirak  Union's  motto: 
“Remembrance for the Deceased, Reconciliation for the Living” as the challenge of his 
Presidency41. The groundwork of  the common sore of History was – in Kaczyński's 
concept  –  the  only  one  indefeasible  principle  of  a  cooperation  between  nations, 
especially with reference to the future of the Polish-Russian Reconciliation.
40 KPRP, Uroczystości w Katyniu, 17th September 2007, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-
aktualnosci/ [accessed: 18.11.2011].
41 KPRP, List Prezydenta RP skierowany do organizatorów i uczestników uroczystości VIII Międzynarodowego  
Marszu Żywej Pamięci Polskiego Sybiru, 11th September 2008, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-
aktualnosci/ [accessed: 20.11.2011].
